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Abstract—The universal secure network coding presented by
Silva et al. realizes secure and reliable transmission of a secret
message over any underlying network code, by using maximum
rank distance codes. Inspired by their result, this paper considers
the secure network coding based on arbitrary linear codes,
and investigates its security performance and error correction
capability that are guaranteed independently of the underlying
network code. The security performance and error correction
capability are said to be universal when they are independent
of underlying network codes. This paper introduces new code
parameters, the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP)
and the relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of linear
codes. We reveal that the universal security performance and
universal error correction capability of secure network coding
are expressed in terms of the RDIP and RGRW of linear codes.
The security and error correction of existing schemes are also
analyzed as applications of the RDIP and RGRW.
I. Introduction
In the scenario of secure network coding introduced by Cai
et al. [2], a source node transmits n packets from n outgoing
links to sink nodes through a network that implements network
coding [1,11,13], and each sink node receives n packets from
n incoming links. In the network, there is a wiretapper who
observes µ(< n) links. The problem is how to encode a secret
message into n transmitted packets at the source node, in such
a way that the wiretapper obtain no information about the
message in the sense of information theoretic security.
As shown in [6], secure network coding can be seen as a
generalization of the wiretap channel II [18] or secret sharing
schemes based on linear codes [3,5] for network coding.
Hence, in secure network coding, the secrecy is realized
by introducing the randomness into n transmitted packets as
follows. Suppose the message is represented by l packets
S 1, . . . , S l (1 ≤ l ≤ n). Then, the source node encodes
(S 1, . . . , S l) together with n−l random packets by linear codes,
and generates n transmitted packets [6,17,21].
Silva et al. [21] proposed the universal secure network
coding that is based on maximum rank distance (MRD)
codes [8]. Their scheme was universal in the sense that their
scheme guarantees that over any underlying network code,
no information about S leaks out even if any n − l links are
observed by a wiretapper. As shown in [21], their scheme with
MRD codes is optimal in terms of security and communication
rate. However, there exists some restrictions in universal secure
network coding with MRD codes. In their scheme, the network
must transport packets of size m ≥ n. The MRD code used in
the scheme is defined over an Fnqm , where Fqm is an m-degree
field extension of a field Fq with order q. Thus, the size of the
field Fqm increases exponentially with m, and the restriction of
MRD codes with m ≥ n invokes the large computational cost
for encoding and decoding of MRD codes if n is large. It is
undesirable especially in resource constraint environments.
Considering secure network coding without such a restric-
tion, Ngai et al. [17], and later Zhang et al. [25], investigated
the security performance of secure network coding based on
general linear codes. They introduced a new parameter of
linear codes, called the relative network generalized Hamming
weight (RNGHW), and revealed that the security performance
is expressed in terms of the RNGHW. The RNGHW depends
on the set of coding vectors of the underlying network code.
Hence, the RNGHW is not universal.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the security perfor-
mance of universal secure network coding based on general
linear codes, which is always guaranteed over any underlying
network code, even over random network code. This paper
defines the universal security performance by the following
two criteria. One is called the universal equivocation Θµ that
is the minimum uncertainty of the message under observation
of µ(< n) links, guaranteed independently of the underlying
network code. The other is called the universal Ω-strong
security, where Ω is a performance measure such that no
part of the secret message is deterministically revealed even
if at most Ω links are observed. The paper [12] proposed a
specific construction of the secure network coding that attains
the universal (n − 1)-strong security, and such a scheme is
called universal strongly secure network coding [20]. Namely,
the definition of universal Ω-strong security given in this paper
is a generalization of universal strongly secure network coding
considered in [12,20] for the number of tapped links.
In order to express Θµ and Ω in terms of code parameters,
this paper introduces two parameters of linear codes, called
the relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) and the
relative generalized rank weight (RGRW). The RGRW is a
generalization of the minimum rank distance [8] of a code. We
reveal that Θµ and Ω can be expressed in terms of the RDIP
and the RGRW of the codes. Duursma et al. [5] first observed
that the relative generalized Hamming weight [14] exactly
expresses the security performance and the error correction
capability of secret sharing. Our definitions of RGRW and
RDIP are motivated by their result [5].
Assume that the attacker is able not only to eavesdrop but
also to inject erroneous packets anywhere in the network.
Also assume that the network may suffer from the rank
deficiency of the transfer matrix at a sink node. Silva et
al.’s scheme based on MRD codes [21] enables to correct
such errors and rank deficiency at each sink node, where its
error correction capability is guaranteed over any underlying
network code, i.e., universal. This paper also generalizes their
result and reveals that the universal error correction capability
of secure network coding based on arbitrary linear codes can
be expressed in terms of the RGRW of the codes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sect. II
presents basic notations, and introduces linear network cod-
ing. Sect. III defines the universal security performance and
universal error correction capability of secure network coding
over wiretap network. Sect. IV defines the RDIP and RGRW of
linear codes, and introduces their basic properties. In Sect. V,
the universal security performance is expressed in terms of the
RDIP and RGRW. The security of existing schemes [12,20,21]
is also analyzed as applications of the RDIP and RGRW in
Examples 17 and 21. Sect. VI gives the expression of the
universal error correction capability in terms of the RGRW,
and also analyze the error correction of [21] by the RGRW in
Example 27.
II. Preliminary
A. Basic Notations
Let H(X) be the Shannon entropy for a random variable X,
H(X|Y) be the conditional entropy of X given Y, and I(X; Y)
be the mutual information between X and Y [4]. We write
|X| as the cardinality of a set X. The entropy and the mutual
information are always computed by using logqm .
Let Fq stand for a finite field containing q elements and Fqm
be an m-degree field extension of Fq (m ≥ 1). Let Fnq denote
an n-dimensional row vector space over Fq. Similarly, Fnqm
stands for an n-dimensional row vector space over Fqm . Unless
otherwise stated, we consider subspaces, ranks, dimensions,
etc, over the field extension Fqm instead of the base field Fq.
An [n, k] linear code C over Fnqm is a k-dimensional subspace
of Fnqm . Let C⊥ denote a dual code of a code C. A subspace
of a code is called a subcode [15]. For C ⊆ Fnqm , we denote by
C|Fq a subfield subcode of C over Fq [15]. Observe that dimC
means the dimension of C as a vector space over Fqm whereas
dimC|Fq is the dimension of C|Fq over Fq.
For a vector ~v = [v1, . . . , vn] ∈ Fnqm and a subspace V ⊆ Fnqm ,
we denote ~v q = [vq1, . . . , v
q
n] and Vq = {~v q : ~v ∈ V}. Define a
family of subspaces V ⊆ Fnqm satisfying V = Vq by Γ(Fnqm ) ,
{subspace V ⊆ Fnqm : V = Vq}. Also define Γi(Fnqm ) , {V ∈
Γ(Fnqm ) : dim V = i}. For a subspace V ⊆Fnqm , the followings are
equivalent: 1) V ∈Γ(Fnqm ); 2) dim V =dim V |Fq [22, Lemma 1].
B. Linear Network Coding
As in [2,6,17,21,25], we consider a multicast communica-
tion network represented by a directed multigraph with unit
capacity links, a single source node, and multiple sink nodes.
We assume that linear network coding [11,13] is employed
over the network. Elements of a column vector space Fm×1q
are called packets. Assume that each link in the network can
carry a single Fq-symbol per one time slot, and that each link
transports a single packet over m time slots without delays,
erasures, or errors.
The source node produces n packets X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Fm×1q and
transmits X1, . . . , Xn on n outgoing links over m consecutive
time slots. Define the m× n matrix X = [X1, . . . , Xn]. The data
flow on any link can be represented as an Fq-linear combi-
nation of packets X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Fm×1q . Namely, the information
transmitted on a link e can be denoted as beXT ∈ F1×mq , where
be ∈ Fnq is called a global coding vector (GCV) of e. Suppose
that a sink node has N incoming links. Then, the information
received at a sink node can be represented as an N ×m matrix
AXT ∈ FN×mq , where A ∈ FN×nq is the transfer matrix constructed
by gathering the GCV’s of N incoming links. The network
code is called feasible if every transfer matrix to a sink node
has rank n over Fq. The system is called coherent if A is known
to each sink node; otherwise, called noncoherent.
III. Universal Security Performance and Universal Error
Correction Capability of Secure Network Coding
This section introduces the wiretap network model with
packet errors and the nested coset coding scheme in secure
network coding [6,17,21,25]. Then, we define the universal
security performance in terms of the universal equivocation
and the universal Ω-strong security on the wiretap network
model. We also define the universal error correction capability
of secure network coding. From now on, only one sink node
is assumed without loss of generality. In addition, we focus on
the fundamental case of coherent systems in this paper due to
the space constraint. But, as in [21], all analysis in this paper
can be easily adapted to the case of noncoherent systems.
A. Wiretap Networks with Errors, and Nested Coset Coding
Following [2,6,17,21,25], assume that in the setup of
Sect. II-B, there is a wiretapper who has access to packets
transmitted on any µ links. Let W be the set of |W| = µ
links observed by the wiretapper. Then the packets observed
by the wiretapper are given by WT = BWXT, where rows of
BW ∈ Fµ×nq are the GCV’s associated with the links in W.
In the scenario [6,17,21,25], the source node first regards an
m-dimensional column vector space Fm×1q as Fqm , and fix l for
1≤ l≤n. Let S = [S 1, . . . , S l]∈Flqm be the secret message, and
assume that S 1, . . . , S l are uniformly distributed over Flqm and
mutually independent. Under the wiretapper’s observation, the
source node wants to transmit S without information leakage
to the wiretapper. To protect S from the wiretapper, the source
node encodes S to a transmitted vector X = [X1, . . . , Xn] ∈
Fnqm of n packets by applying the nested coset coding scheme
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[3,5,23,24] on S . In [3,5], its special case is called a secret
sharing scheme based on linear codes.
Definition 1 (Nested Coset Coding Scheme). Let C1 ⊆ Fnqm be
a linear code over Fqm (m ≥ 1), and C2 $ C1 be its subcode
with dimension dimC2 = dimC1 − l over Fqm . Let ψ : Flqm →
C1/C2 be an arbitrary isomorphism. For a secret message S ∈
Flqm , we choose X from a coset ψ(S ) ∈ C1/C2 uniformly at
random and independently of S .
Then, the source node finally transmit X over the network
coded network. Def. 1 includes the Ozarow-Wyner coset cod-
ing scheme [18] as a special case with C1 = Fnqm . Hence, when
we set C1 = Fnqm , this is the secure network coding based on
Ozarow-Wyner coset coding scheme [6,17,21].
Corresponding to X transmitted from the source node, the
sink node receives a vector of N packets Y ∈ FNqm . Here we
extend the basic network model described in Sect. II-B to
incorporate packet errors and rank deficiency of the transfer
matrix A ∈ FN×nq of the sink node. Suppose that at most t errors
can occur in any of links, causing the corresponding packets
to become corrupted. Then, as [19], Y can be expressed by
YT = AXT + DZT,
where Z ∈ Ftqm is the t error packets, and D ∈ FN×tq is the
transfer matrix of Z. We define ρ , n − rank A as the rank
deficiency of A. In this setup, we want to decode S correctly
from Y. If the network is free of errors and the network code
used is feasible, X can be always reconstructed from YT = AXT
as described in Sect. II-B. Then, the coset ψ(S ), and hence S ,
is uniquely determined from X from Def. 1.
B. Definition of Universal Security Performance
The security performance of secure network coding in the
above model was measured by the following criterion [17,25].
Definition 2 (Equivocation). The minimum uncertainty θµ of
S given BWXT for all possible W’s (|W| = µ) in the network
is called equivocation, defined as θµ, min
W:|W|=µ
H(S |BWXT).
As defined in Def. 2, θµ depends on the underlying network
code. In [17,25], θµ for m = 1 was expressed in terms of the
relative network generalized Hamming weight (RNGHW) of
C1 and C2. The RNGHW is the value determined according to
GCV’s of all links in the network. Hence, the RNGHW cannot
determine the equivocation over random linear network code
[10]. Here, we extend Def. 2 by requiring the independence of
the underlying network code, as follows.
Definition 3 (Universal Equivocation). The universal equivo-
cation Θµ is the minimum uncertainty of S given BXT for all
B ∈ Fµ×nq , defined as
Θµ , min
B∈Fµ×nq
H(S |BXT).
As defined in Def. 3, Θµ does not depend on the set of W’s
in the network. Silva et al.’s universal secure network coding
scheme based on MRD codes [21] achieves Θn−l = H(S ) in
Def. 3 provided m ≥ n.
Def. 3 defines the security for the whole components of a
message S = [S 1, . . . , S l]. Here we focus on the security for
every part of S , and give the following definition.
Definition 4 (Universal Ω-Strong Security). Let SZ = (S i :
i ∈ Z) be a tuple for a subset Z ⊆ {1, . . . , l}. We say that a
secure network coding scheme attains the universal Ω-strong
security if we have
I(SZ; BXT) = 0, ∀Z,∀B ∈ F(Ω−|Z|+1)×nq . (1)
As [9,16,20], a scheme with universal Ω-strong security
does not leak any |Z| components of S even if at most
Ω − |Z| + 1 links are observed by the wiretapper. Moreover,
this guarantee holds over any underlying network code as
Θµ. We note that if a scheme achieves the Ω-strong security,
the universal equivocation Θµ for µ = Ω − l + 1 must be
ΘΩ−l+1 = H(S ) as shown in Def. 4. However, the converse
does not always hold.
The scheme in [12] achieves Ω = n−1 provided m ≥ l+n by
nested coset coding with MRD codes. The universal strongly
security in [20] is a special case of Def. 4 with Ω = n − 1.
C. Definition of the Universal Error Correction Capability of
Secure Network Coding
In the model described in Sect. III-A, the error correction
capability of secure network coding, guaranteed over any
underlying network code, is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Universally t-Error-ρ-Erasure-Correcting Secure
Network Coding). A secure network coding scheme is called
universally t-error-ρ-erasure-correcting, if
H(S |Y) = 0, YT = AXT + DZT,
∀A∈FN×nq : rank A≥n−ρ,∀X ∈ ψ(S ),∀D∈FN×tq ,∀Z∈Ftqm ,
i.e., S can be uniquely determined from Y against t errors over
any underlying network code with at most ρ rank deficiency.
Silva et al.’s scheme [21, Section VI] is universally t-error-
ρ-erasure-correcting when the minimum rank distance [8] of
C1 is greater than 2t + ρ.
IV. New Parameters of Linear Codes and Their Properties
This section introduce the relative dimension/intersection
profile (RDIP) and the relative generalized rank weight
(RGRW) of linear codes. In the following sections, these
parameters are used to characterize the universal security
performance and the universal error correction capability of
secure network coding.
A. Definition
We first define the relative dimension/intersection profile
(RDIP) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 6 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile). Let
C1 ⊆ F
n
qm be a linear code and C2 $ C1 be its subcode. Then,
the i-th relative dimension/intersection profile (RDIP) of C1
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and C2 is the greatest difference between dimensions over Fqm
of intersections, defined as
KR,i(C1,C2) , max
V∈Γi(Fnqm )
{dim (C1 ∩ V) − dim (C2 ∩ V)} , (2)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next, we define the relative generalized rank weight
(RGRW) of linear codes as follows.
Definition 7 (Relative Generalized Rank Weight). Let C1 ⊆
Fnqm be a linear code and C2 $ C1 be its subcode. Then, the
i-th relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) of C1 and C2 is
defined by
MR,i(C1,C2)
,min
{
dim V : V ∈Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C1∩V)−dim (C2∩V)≥ i
}
, (3)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ dim (C1/C2).
The relative dimension/length profile and the relative gen-
eralized Hamming weight introduced in [14] are equivalent to
Eqs. (2) and (3) with Γi(Fnqm ) and Γ(Fnqm ) replaced by suitable
smaller sets, respectively.
B. Basic Properties of the RDIP and the RGRW, and the
Relation between the Rank Distance and the RGRW
This subsection introduces some basic properties of the
RDIP and the RGRW, and also shows the relation between
the RGRW and the rank distance [8]. These will be used
for expressions of the universal security performance and the
universal error correction capability of secure network coding.
First, we introduce the following theorem and lemma about
the RDIP and the RGRW.
Theorem 8 (Monotonicity of the RDIP). Let C1 ⊆ Fnqm be
a linear code and C2 $ C1 be its subcode. Then, the i-th
RDIP KR,i(C1,C2) is nondecreasing with i from KR,0(C1,C2) =
0 to KR,n(C1,C2) = dim (C1/C2), and 0 ≤ KR,i+1(C1,C2) −
KR,i(C1,C2) ≤ 1 holds.
Proof: KR,0(C1,C2) = 0 and KR,n(C1,C2) = dim (C1/C2),
are obvious from Def. 6. Recall that
Γi(Fnqm ) =
{
V ⊆ Fnqm : V = {~uG : ~u ∈ Fiqm},G ∈ Fi×nq , rank G = i
}
,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n from [22, Lemma 1]. This implies that for
any subspace V1 ∈ Γi+1(Fnqm ), there always exist some V2’s
satisfying V2 ∈ Γi(Fnqm ) and V2 $ V1. This yields KR,i(C1,C2) ≤
KR,i+1(C1,C2).
Next we show that the increment at each step is at most 1.
Consider arbitrary subspaces V,V ′ ∈ Γ(Fnqm ) such that dim V ′ =
dim V + 1 and V $ V ′. Let f = dim (C1 ∩ V) − dim (C2 ∩ V);
g = dim (C1 ∩ V ′) − dim (C2 ∩ V ′). Since dim (C1 ∩ V) + 1 ≥
dim (C1∩V ′)≥dim (C1∩V) and C2 $ C1, we have f+1 ≥ g ≥ f
and hence KR,i(C1,C2) + 1 ≥ KR,i+1(C1,C2) ≥ KR,i(C1,C2).
Lemma 9. Let C1 ⊆ Fnqm be a linear code and C2 $ C1
be its subcode. Then, the i-th RGRW MR,i(C1,C2) is strictly
increasing with i. Moreover, MR,0(C1,C2) = 0 and
MR,i(C1,C2) = min
{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) = i
}
= min
{
dim V : V ∈ Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C1 ∩ V) − dim (C2 ∩ V) = i
}
,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ dim (C1/C2).
Proof: First we have
min
{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) ≥ i
}
=min
{ j : ∃V ∈Γ j(Fnqm ), such that dim (C1∩V)−dim (C2∩V)≥ i}
=min
{
dim V : V ∈ Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C1 ∩ V) − dim (C2 ∩ V) ≥ i
}
=MR,i(C1,C2).
From Theorem 8, we have
{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) = i
}
∩{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) ≥ i + 1
}
= ∅. We thus have
MR,i(C1,C2) = min
{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) ≥ i
}
= min
{
j : KR, j(C1,C2) = i
}
.
Therefore the RGRW is strictly increasing with i and thus
MR,i(C1,C2)
= min
{
dim V : V ∈ Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C1 ∩ V) − dim (C2 ∩ V) = i
}
,
is established.
Next, we show the relation between the rank distance [8]
and the RGRW. Let φm : Fqm → Fm×1q be an Fq-linear
isomorphism that expands an element of Fqm as a column
vector over Fq with respect to some fixed basis for Fqm over Fq.
Then, we define the rank over Fq of a vector ~x = [x1, . . . , xn] ∈
Fnqm , denoted by rankFq (~x), as the rank of m × n matrix[
φm(x1), . . . , φm(xn)] over Fq. The rank distance [8] between
two vectors ~x, ~y ∈ Fnqm is given by dR(~x, ~y) , rank Fq (~y − ~x).
The minimum rank distance [8] of a code C is given as dR(C),
min{dR(~x, ~y) : ~x, ~y ∈C, ~x,~y}=min{dR(~x, ~0) : ~x ∈C, ~x,~0}. For
a subspace V ⊆ Fnqm , we define by V∗ ,
∑m−1
i=0 Vq
i
the sum of
subspaces V,Vq, . . . ,Vqm−1 .
Lemma 10. For a subspace V ⊆ Fnqm with dim V = 1, we have
dim V∗ = dR(V).
Proof: Let ~b= [b1, . . . , bn]∈V be a nonzero vector, which
implies rank Fq (~b)=dR(V). Let M,
[
ai, j
]m,n
i, j=1∈F
m×n
qm , ai, j=b
qi−1
j .
Each vector in V∗ is represented by an Fqm -linear combination
of ~b, ~bq, . . . , ~bqm−1 , and hence dim V∗= rank M.
For α1, α2 ∈ Fq, β1, β2 ∈ Fqm , we have α1φm(β1)+α2φm(β2)=
φm(α1β1 + α2β2). This implies that there always exists some
P∈Fn×nq with rank P=n satisfying
~bP= [g1, . . . , gdR(V), 0, . . . , 0]∈Fnqm , g j,0, (4)
where g1, . . . , gdR(V) are linearly independent over Fq, and
note that P represents the elementary column operation on
[φm(b1), . . . , φm(bn)]. Also for α1, α2 ∈ Fq, β1, β2 ∈ Fqm , we
have α1βq
i
1 + α2β
qi
2 = (α1β1 + α2β2)q
i (0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1).
Hence, for P ∈ Fn×nq satisfying Eq. (4), we also have ~bq
i P =
[gqi1 , . . . , g
qi
dR(V), 0, . . . , 0] ∈ F
n
qm for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Thus, by
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the elementary column operation on M over Fq, represented
by P, we get MP. By eliminating zero columns from MP,
we obtain a matrix M′ =
[
fi, j
]m,dR(V)
i, j=1 , fi, j = g
qi−1
j , where
rank M′ = rank M. Let M′k ∈ F
k×dR(V)
qm (1 ≤ k ≤ dR(V)) be
the submatrix consisting of the first k rows of M′. Since
dR(V)≤min{m, n} and g1, . . . , gdR(V) are linearly independent,
M′k is the generator matrix of [dR(V), k] Gabidulin code and
rank M′k = k [8]. Thus, M′dR(V) is nonsingular, and hence we
have rank M′dR(V) = rank M
′ = dR(V). Therefore, dim V∗ =
rank M= rank M′=dR(V).
Lemma 11. For a code C1 ⊆ Fnqm and its subcode C2 $
C1, the first RGRW can be represented as MR,1(C1,C2) =
min
{
dR(~x, ~0) : ~x ∈ C1\C2
}
.
Proof: MR(C1,C2) can be represented as
MR,1(C1,C2)
= min
{
dim W : W ∈Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C1 ∩W)−dim (C2 ∩ W)≥1
}
= min
{
dim W : W ∈ Γ(Fnqm ),
∃V⊆W such that V⊆ (C1 ∩ W),V* (C2 ∩ W), dim V≥1
}
. (5)
For any subspace V ⊆ Fnqm with dim V ≥1, there always exists
some W ∈Γ(Fnqm ) satisfying W⊇V , because we have V∗∈Γ(Fnqm )
and V∗⊇V . Also, for subspaces W and V⊆W with dim V≥1,
if W is the smallest space in Γ(Fnqm ) including V , then W=V∗
[22]. Thus Eq. (5) can be rewritten as
min
{
dim W : V⊆Fnqm , dim V≥1
∃W⊇V,W ∈Γ(Fnqm ), such that V ⊆ (C1 ∩ W),V* (C2 ∩ W)
}
= min
{
dim V∗ : V ⊆Fnqm ,V⊆ (C1∩V∗),V* (C2∩V∗), dim V ≥1
}
= min {dim V∗ : V ⊆ C1,V * C2, dim V ≥ 1} , (6)
where the last equality of Eq. (6) is obtained by V ⊆ (C1 ∩
V∗) ⇔ V ⊆ C1, and V * (C2 ∩ V∗) ⇔ V * C1 from V∗ ⊇ V .
For subspaces V and V ′ ⊇ V , we have dim V∗ ≤ dim V ′∗.
Therefore, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as follows.
min {dim V∗ : V ⊆ C1,V * C2, dim V ≥ 1}
= min {dim V∗ : V ⊆ C1,V * C2, dim V = 1}
= min {dR(V) : V ⊆ C1,V * C2, dim V = 1} (by Lemma 10)
= min
{
dR(~x, ~0) : ~x ∈ C1\C2
}
.
Lemma 11 immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 12. For a linear code C, dR(C) = MR,1(C, {~0}) holds.
This shows that MR,1(·, {~0}) is a generalization of dR(·).
Now we present the following proposition that generalizes the
Singleton-type bound of the rank distance [8].
Proposition 13 (Generalization of Singleton-Type Bound).
Let C1 ⊆ Fnqm be a linear code and C2 $ C1 be its subcode.
Then, the RGRW of C1 and C2 is upper bounded by
MR,i(C1,C2) ≤ min
{
1, m(n − dimC2)
}
(n − dimC1) + i, (7)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ dim (C1/C2).
Proof: We can consider that C2 is a systematic code
without loss of generality. That is, the first dimC2 coordinates
of each basis of C2 is one of canonical bases of FdimC2qm . Let
S $ Fnqm be a linear code such that C1 is a direct sum of C2
and S. Then, after suitable permutation of coordinates, a basis
of S can be chosen such that its first dimC2 coordinates are
zero. Then, the effective length [7] of a code S is less than or
equal to n − dimC2. Hence we have
dR(S) ≤ min
{
1, m
n − dimC2
}
(n − dimC2 − dimS) + 1,
= min
{
1, m
n − dimC2
}
(n − dimC1) + 1, (8)
from the Singleton-type bound for rank metric [8].
Here we write κ = min {1,m/(n − dimC2)} for the sake of
simplicity. Recall that dR(S) = MR,1(S, {~0}) from Corol. 12,
and MR,1(S, {~0}) ≤ κ(n − dimC1) + 1 holds from Eq. (8).
We shall use the mathematical induction on t. We see that
Eq. (9) is true for t = 1. Assume that for some t ≥ 1,
MR,t(S, {~0}) ≤ κ(n − dimC1) + t, (9)
is true. Then, by the monotonicity shown in Prop. 9,
MR,t+1(S, {~0}) ≤ MR,t(S, {~0}) + 1 ≤ κ(n − dimC1) + t + 1,
holds. Thus, it is proved by mathematical induction that Eq. (9)
holds for 1 ≤ t ≤ dim (C1/C2).
Lastly, we prove Eq. (7) by the above discussion about the
RGRW of S and {~0}. For an arbitrary fixed subspace V ⊆ Fnqm ,
we have dim (C1∩V) ≥ dim (S∩V)+dim (C2∩V), because C1 is
a direct sum of S and C2. Hence, dim (C1∩V)−dim (C2∩V) ≥
dim (S ∩ V) holds, and we have MR,i(C1,C2) ≤ MR,i(S, {~0})
for 1 ≤ i ≤ dim (C1/C2) from Def. 7. Therefore, from the
foregoing proof, we have
MR,i(C1,C2) ≤ MR,i(S, {~0}) ≤ κ(n − dimC1) + i,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ dim (C1/C2), and the proposition is proved.
Prop. 13 immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 14. For a linear code C ⊆ Fnqm , MR,i(C, {~0}) ≤
min{1,m/n}(n − dimC) + i for 1 ≤ i ≤ dimC. The equality
holds for all i if and only if C is an MRD code.
V. Universal Security Performance onWiretap Networks
In this section, we express Θµ and Ω given in Sect. III-B
in terms of the RDIP and RGRW. From now on, we use the
following definition.
Definition 15. For B∈Fµ×nq , we define VB, {~uB : ~u∈Fµqm }⊆Fnqm .
Recall that if an Fqm -linear space V ⊆ Fnqm admits a basis in
Fnq then V ∈ Γ(Fnqm ) [22], which implies
VB ∈ Γ(Fnqm ). (10)
First, we give the following theorem for the universal
equivocation Θµ given in Def. 3
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Theorem 16. Consider the nested coset coding in Def. 1.
Then, the universal equivocation Θµ of C1,C2 is given by
Θµ = l − KR,µ(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ).
Proof: Let B ∈ Fµ×nq be an arbitrary matrix. By the chain
rule [4], we have the following equation for the conditional
entropy of S given BXT:
H(S |BXT) = H(S , X|BXT) − H(X|S , BXT)
= H(X|BXT) + H(S |X, BXT) − H(X|S , BXT)
= H(X|BXT) − H(X|S , BXT). (11)
Then, from [25, Proof of Lemma 4.2], we have
H(X|BXT) = n − dimC⊥1 − dim VB + dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB),
H(X|S , BXT) = n − dimC⊥2 − dim VB + dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB).
By substituting these equations into Eq. (11), we have
H(S |BXT) = dimC⊥2 −dimC⊥1 −dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB)+dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB)
= l − dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB) + dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB). (12)
By Eq. (10) we have{
VB : B ∈ Fµ×nq
}
=
⋃
i≤µ
Γi(Fnqm ). (13)
Thus, by Eq. (12) and Def. 6, the universal equivocation Θµ is
given as follows.
Θµ = min
B∈Fµ×nq
H(S |BXT)
= l − max
B∈Fµ×nq
{
dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB)
}
= l − max
V∈
⋃
i≤µ Γi(Fnqm )
{
dim (C⊥2 ∩ V) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ V)
}
(by Eq. (13))
= l − max
V∈Γµ(Fnqm )
{
dim (C⊥2 ∩ V) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ V)
}
(by Thm. 8)
= l − KR,µ(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ).
Example 17. The existing schemes [12,20,21] used MRD
codes as C⊥1 and C
⊥
2 , where m ≥ n. By Corol. 12, we have
dim (V ∩ C⊥2 ) = 0 for any V ∈ ΓdimC2 (Fnqm ). This implies
KR,µ(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ) = KR,µ(C⊥2 , {~0}) = 0 for 0 ≤ µ ≤ dimC2.
On the other hand, KR,dimC1 (C⊥2 , {~0}) = dimC1 − dimC2 by
Corol. 14. Since dim (V ∩ C⊥1 ) = 0 for any V ∈ ΓdimC1(Fnqm )
by Corol. 12, we have KR,dimC1 (C⊥2 ,C⊥1 )=dimC1−dimC2. By
Theorem 8, KR,µ(C⊥2 , C⊥1 )=µ−dimC2 for dimC2≤µ≤dimC1.
By Theorem 16, we see that Θµ = l−max{0, µ−dimC2} for
0≤µ≤dimC1(= l+dimC2) in the schemes [12,20,21].
We then have the following corollary by the RGRW.
Corol. 18 shows that the wiretapper obtain no information of
S from any MR,1(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ) − 1 links.
Corollary 18. Consider the nested coset coding in Def. 1.
Then, the wiretapper must observe at least MR, j(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ) links
to obtain the mutual information j (1 ≤ j ≤ l) between S and
observed packets.
Proof: From Eq. (12), the smallest number µ of tapped
links satisfying I(S ; BXT) = j (1 ≤ j ≤ l) is
min
{
µ : ∃B ∈ Fµ×nq , I(S ; BXT) = j
}
= min
{
µ : ∃B ∈ Fµ×nq , l − H(S |BXT) = j
}
= min
{
µ : ∃B ∈ Fµ×nq , dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB) = j
}
.
From [22, Lemma 1] and Lemma 9, this equation can be
rewritten as follows.
min
{
µ : ∃B ∈ Fµ×nq , dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB) = j
}
= min
{
dim V : V ∈ Γ(Fnqm ), dim (C⊥2 ∩ V) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ V) = j
}
= MR, j(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ).
Although the message S has been assumed to be uniformly
distributed over Flqm in Sect. III-A, the following proposition
reveals that the wiretapper still obtain no information of S
from any MR,1(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ) − 1 links even if S is arbitrarily
distributed.
Proposition 19. Fix the transfer matrix B to the wiretapper.
Suppose that the wiretapper obtain no information of S from
BXT when S is uniformly distributed over Flqm as described in
Sect. III-A. Then, even if S is chosen according to an arbitrary
distribution over Flqm , the wiretapper still obtain no information
of S from BXT, that is, I(S ; BXT) = 0.
Proof: When we assume that S is arbitrarily distributed
over Flqm , H(X|S , BXT) is upper bounded as follows from [21,
Proof of Lemma 6] and [25, Proof of Lemma 4.2].
H(X|S , BXT) ≤ n − dimC⊥2 − dim VB + dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB).
Also, since X is uniformly distributed over a coset ψ(S ) ∈
C1/C2 for fixed S , we have H(X|S ) = dimC2 = n − dimC⊥2 .
For the dimension of a subspace {BXT : X ∈ C1}, we have
dim {BXT : X ∈ C1} = rank BGT = rank GBT
= dim {G~vT : ~v ∈ VB} = dim VB − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB),
where G ∈ FdimC1×nqm is a generator matrix of C1. Hence we
have H(BXT) ≤ dim VB − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB). We thus have
I(S ; BXT) = I(S , X; BXT) − I(X; BXT|S )
= H(BXT) − H(X|S ) + H(X|S , BXT)
≤ dim (C⊥2 ∩ VB) − dim (C⊥1 ∩ VB) (14)
for any distribution of S . By I(S ; BXT) = H(S )−H(S |BXT) and
Eq. (12) we can see that the equality holds if S is uniformly
distributed. Therefore, for fixed B, if I(S ; BXT) = 0 holds for
uniformly distributed S , then the right hand side of Eq. (14)
is zero, which implies that I(S ; BXT) = 0 also holds for
arbitrarily distributed S from the nonnegativity of mutual
information [4].
Lastly, we express Ω in Def. 4 in terms of the RGRW. For
a subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , N} and a vector ~c = [c1, . . . , cN] ∈
FNqm , let PJ (~c) be a vector of length |J| over Fqm , ob-
tained by removing the t-th components ct for t < J . For
example for J = {1, 3} and ~c = [1, 1, 0, 1] (N = 4),
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we have PJ (~c) = [1, 0]. The punctured code PJ (C) of
a code C ∈ FNqn is given by PJ (C) ,
{
PJ (~c) : ~c ∈ C}.
The shortened code CJ of a code C ⊆ FNqm is defined
by CJ ,
{
PJ (~c) : ~c = [c1, . . . , cN] ∈ C, ci = 0 for i < J}. For
example for C = {[0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0], [1, 0, 1], [0, 1, 1]} (N = 3)
and J = {2, 3}, we have CJ = {[0, 0], [1, 1]}. We then have the
following theorem for the universal Ω-strong security defined
in Def. 4.
Theorem 20. Let {i} , {1, . . . , l + n}\{i}. Fix C1, C2 and ψ
in Def. 1 and consider the corresponding nested coset coding
scheme in Def. 1. By using C1, C2 and ψ, define
C′1 ,
{
[S , X] : S ∈ Flqm and X ∈ ψ(S )
}
⊆ Fl+nqm .
For each index 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we define a punctured code D1,i of
C′1 as D1,i , P{i}(C′1) ⊆ Fl+n−1qm , and a shortened code D2,i of
C′1 as D2,i , (C′1){i} ⊆ Fl+n−1qm . Then, the value Ω in Def. 4 is
given by
Ω = min
{
MR,1(D⊥2,i,D⊥1,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l
}
− 1. (15)
Proof: Define C′2 , {[~0, ~c2] : ~c2 ∈ C2} ⊆ Fl+nqm . Since
C2 $ C1, C
′
2 is also a subcode of C′1. Thus, in terms of C′1 and
C′2, we can see that the vector [S , X] ∈ Fl+nqm is generated by a
nested coset coding scheme of C′1 and C
′
2 from S . Then, from
the definition of C′1 and C′2, we can see that D2,i is a subcode
of D1,i with dimension dimD2,i = dimD1,i − 1 = dimC1 − 1
over Fqm for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Let L , {1, . . . , l} and SL\{i} , [S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S l]
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ l. For S i ∈ Fqm define a coset
φ(S i) ,
{
[SL\{i}, X] : SL\{i} ∈ Fl−1qm and X ∈ ψ(S )
}
∈ D1,i/D2,i.
Here we define Z
{i} , P{i}([S , X]) = [SL\{i}, X] ∈ D1,i.
Recall that S 1, . . . , S l are mutually independent and uniformly
distributed over Fqm . Thus, considering a nested coset coding
scheme that generates Z
{i} from a secret message S i ∈ Fqm
with D1,D2, we can see that Z{i} ∈ φ(S i) ∈ D1,i/D2,i
is chosen uniformly at random from φ(S i). Therefore, we
have I(S i; DZT
{i}
) = 0 for any D ∈ Fµ×(n+l−1)q whenever
µ < MR,1(D⊥2,i,D⊥1,i) from Corol. 18.
For an arbitrary subset R ⊆ L\{i}, define a matrix FR that
consists of |R| rows of an (l − 1) × (l − 1) identity matrix,
satisfying [S j : j ∈ R]T = FRS TL\{i}. For an arbitrary matrix
B∈Fk×nq (0≤ k≤ n), set D=
[
FR O
O B
]
. Then, from the foregoing
proof, we have
0 = I(S i; DZT
{i}
) = I(S i; S R, BXT) = H(S i|S R) − H(S i|BXT, S R)
= H(S i) − H(S i|BXT, S R) = I(S i; BXT|S R),
whenever |R|+k < M1(D⊥2,i,D⊥1,i). Since I(S i; BXT|S R) = 0 is
equivalent to Eq. (1) from [20, Prop. 5], we have Eq. (15) by
selecting the minimum value of MR,1(D⊥2,i,D⊥1,i)−1 for 1≤ i≤ l.
Example 21. The scheme proposed in [12] used a systematic
MRD code as C′1 (not C1), where m ≥ l + n. We proved
min
{
MR,1(D⊥2,i,D⊥1,i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l
}
= n in [12, Proof of Theorem
4]. By Theorem 20, we see that the scheme [12] attains the
universal (n − 1)-strong security in the sense of Def. 4, while
[12] proved it by adapting the proof argument in [20].
As shown in Prop. 19, no information of S is leaked from
less than MR,1(C⊥2 ,C⊥1 ) tapped links even if S is arbitrarily
distributed. In contrast, S must be uniformly distributed over
Flqm to establish Theorem 20. This is because elements of S
need to be treated as extra random packets, as in strongly
secure network coding schemes [9,16,20].
VI. Universal Error Correction Capability of Secure
Network Coding
This section derives the universal error correction capability
by the approach of [19, Section III]. Recall that the received
packets Y is given by YT = AXT + DZT in the setup of
Sect. III-A, and that X is chosen from the coset ψ(S ) ∈ C1/C2
corresponding to S by the nested coset coding in Def. 1. From
now on, we write X , ψ(S ) for the sake of simplicity.
First, we define the discrepancy [19] between X and Y by
∆A(X, Y),min{r∈N : D∈FN×rq , Z∈Frqm , X∈X, YT=AXT+DZT}
=min
{
dR(XAT, Y) : X ∈ X
}
, (16)
where the second equality is derived from [19, Lemma 4].
This definition of ∆A(X, Y) represents the minimum number r
of error packets Z required to be injected in order to transform
at least one element of X into Y, as [20, Eq. (9)].
Next, we define the ∆-distance [19] between X and X′,
induced by ∆A(X, Y), as
δA(X,X′) , min
{
∆A(X, Y) + ∆A(X′, Y) : Y ∈ FNqm
}
, (17)
for X,X′ ∈ C1/C2.
Lemma 22. For X,X′ ∈ C1/C2, we have
δA(X,X′) = min
{
dR(XAT, X′AT) : X ∈ X, X′ ∈ X′
}
. (18)
Proof: First we have
δA(X,X′) = min
{
∆A(X, Y) + ∆A(X′, Y) : Y ∈ FNqm
}
=min
{
min
{
dR(XAT, Y) : X ∈ X
}
+ min
{
dR(X′AT, Y) : X′ ∈ X′
}
: Y ∈ FNqm
}
=min
{
dR(XAT, Y)+dR(X′AT, Y) : X∈X, X′∈X′, Y ∈FNqm
}
. (19)
The rank distance satisfies the triangle inequality
dR(XAT, XAT) ≤ dR(XAT, Y) + dR(X′AT, Y) for ∀Y ∈ FNqm
[8]. This lower bound can be achieved by choosing,
e.g., Y = XAT. Therefore, from Eq. (19), we have Eq. (18).
The next lemma shows that ∆A(X, Y) is normal [19, Defi-
nition 1].
Lemma 23. For all X,X′ ∈ C1/C2 and all 0 ≤ i ≤ δA(X,X′),
there exists some Y ∈ Fnqm such that ∆A(X, Y) = i and
∆A(X′, Y) = δA(X,X′) − i.
Proof: Let X,X′ ∈ C1/C2 and let 0 ≤ i ≤ d =
δA(X,X′). Then, d = min
{
dR(XAT, X′AT) : X ∈ X, X′ ∈ X′
}
from Lemma 22. Let ¯X ∈ X and ¯X′ ∈ X′ be vectors
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satisfying d = dR( ¯XAT, ¯X′AT). From the proof of [19, Theorem
6], we can always find two vectors W,W′ ∈ Fnqm such that
W +W′ = ( ¯X′ − ¯X)AT, rank Fq (W) = i and rank Fq (W′) = d − i.
Taking ¯Y = ¯XAT + W = ¯X′AT − W′, we have dR( ¯XAT, ¯Y) = i
and dR( ¯X′AT, ¯Y) = d − i. We thus obtain ∆A(X, ¯Y) ≤ i and
∆A(X′, ¯Y) ≤ d − i from Eq. (16). On the other hand, since
δA(X,X′) = d, we have ∆A(X, Y) + ∆A(X′, Y) ≥ d for any
Y ∈ Fnqm from from Eq. (17). Therefore, ∆A(X, ¯Y) = i and
∆A(X′, ¯Y) = d − i hold.
Let δA(C1/C2) be the minimum ∆-distance given by
δA(C1/C2) , min {δA(X,X′) : X,X′ ∈ C1/C2,X , X′} .
As [19, Theorem 7], from Lemma 23 and [19, Theorem 3],
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 24. A nested coset coding scheme with C1,C2
is guaranteed to determine the unique coset X against any t
packet errors for any fixed A if and only if δA(C1/C2)>2t.
Here we note that if X is uniquely determined, S is also
uniquely determined from Def. 1.
Lemma 25. δA(C1/C2) = min{dR(XAT, X′AT) : X, X′∈ C1, X′−
X<C2}.
Proof:
δA(C1/C2) = min {δA(X,X′) : X,X′ ∈ C1/C2,X , X′}
=min
{
min
{
dR(XAT, X′AT) : X∈X, X′∈X′
}
:X,X′∈C1/C2,X,X
′
}
=min
{
dR(XAT, X′AT) : X∈X∈C1/C2, X′∈X′ ∈C1/C2,X,X′
}
=min
{
dR(XAT, X′AT) : X, X′ ∈ C1, X′ − X < C2
}
.
Theorem 26. Consider the nested coset coding in Def. 1.
Then, the scheme is a universally (i.e., simultaneously for all
A ∈ FN×nq with rank deficiency at most ρ) t-error-ρ-erasure-
correcting secure network coding if and only if MR,1(C1,C2) >
2t + ρ.
Proof: For the rank deficiency ρ = n− rank A, we have
dR(X, X′)−ρ≤dR(XAT, X′AT), and there always exists A ∈ FN×nq
depending on (X, X′) such that the equality holds. Thus, from
Lemma 25, we have
min
A∈FN×nq :
rank A=n−ρ
δA(C1/C2)=min {dR(X, X′) : X, X′∈C1, X′−X<C2}−ρ
=min
{
dR(X, ~0) : X ∈ C1, X < C2
}
− ρ
=MR,1(C1,C2) − ρ. (by Lemma 11)
Therefore, we have min
A:rank A=n−ρ
δA(C1/C2)< min
A:rank A=n−ρ′
δA(C1/C2)
for ρ > ρ′, and hence we obtain min
A:rank A≥n−ρ
δA(C1/C2) =
min
A:rank A=n−ρ
δA(C1/C2) = MR,1(C1,C2)−ρ.
Example 27. The existing scheme [21] used MRD codes
as C1,C2, where m ≥ n. Then, by Corol. 14, we have
MR,1(C1, {~0}) = n − dimC1 + 1. Since dim (V ∩ C2) = 0 for
any V ∈ ΓdimC⊥2 (Fnqm ) by Corol. 12 and dimC⊥2 > n − dimC1,
we have MR,1(C1,C2) = MR,1(C1, {~0}). Thus, by Theorem 26
and Corol. 12, the scheme is universally t-error-ρ-erasure-
correcting when MR(C1, {~0}) = dR(C1) > 2t + ρ, as shown
in [21, Theorem 11].
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